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Abstract
Global HIV control funding falls short of need. To maximize health outcomes, it is critical that national governments sustain
reasonable commitments, and that international donor assistance be distributed according to country needs and funding
gaps. We develop a country classification framework in terms of actual versus expected national domestic funding,
considering resource needs and donor financing. With UNAIDS and World Bank data, we examine domestic and donor HIV
program funding in relation to need in 84 low- and middle-income countries. We estimate expected domestic contributions
per person living with HIV (PLWH) as a function of per capita income, relative size of the health sector, and per capita
foreign debt service. Countries are categorized according to levels of actual versus expected domestic contributions, and
resource gap. Compared to national resource needs (UNAIDS Investment Framework), we identify imbalances among
countries in actual versus expected domestic and donor contributions: 17 countries, with relatively high HIV prevalence and
GNI per capita, have domestic funding below expected (median per PLWH $143 and $376, respectively), yet total available
funding including from donors would exceed the need ($368 and $305, respectively) if domestic contribution equaled
expected. Conversely, 27 countries have actual domestic funding above the expected (medians $294 and $149) but total
(domestic+donor) funding does not meet estimated need ($685 and $1,173). Across the 84 countries, in 2009, estimated
resource need totaled $10.3 billion, actual domestic contributions $5.1 billion and actual donor contributions $3.7 billion. If
domestic contributions would increase to the expected level in countries where the actual was below expected, total
domestic contributions would increase to $7.4 billion, turning a funding gap of $1.5 billion into a surplus of $0.8 billion. Even
with imperfect funding and resource-need data, the proposed country classification could help improve coherence and
efficiency in domestic and international allocations.
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Introduction
An unprecedented increase in global spending on HIV/AIDS
has occurred in the last decade; reaching over USD$16.8 billion in
2011 [1]. However, available funding continues to fall short of the
global need to achieve global targets (such as the Millennium
Development Goals); and after the rise in international funding
slowed down due to the global crisis over 2009–12, it is now
essentially flat or decreasing [2–4]. Better mechanisms are needed
to enhance efficiency and optimize HIV allocations, on both
donor and recipient sides, in relation to disease burden, as well as
marginalized and vulnerable groups [1,5–7].
One way to ensure sustainable funding for HIV would be
through the definition of donor obligations as a set annual amount
or proportion in relation to country income level. The United
Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) declaration
of 2001 proposed a ‘‘target of 0.7% of their gross national product
for overall official development assistance, and (…) earmarking of
0.15% to 0.20% of gross national product as official development
assistance for least developed countries [8].’’ In 2002 activists from
the Global AIDS Alliance argued that the Global Fund to fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) should have a
similar definition of donor funding obligations as that of the UN
budget; and that G-7 nations should contribute three-fourths of
total requirements [9]. A so-called ‘‘equitable contributions
framework’’ was proposed by Oxfam, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res
(MSF) and Fund the Fund, by which the total amount of requests
made by recipient countries to the Global Fund should be divided
over the 37 or 47 wealthiest countries in proportion to their GDP
[10,11]. Wealthier countries fell short on the 0.7% GDP
commitment recommended by UNGASS [12]. Also, over recent
years some donor nations have sometimes fallen short of, or
delayed, the disbursement of their pledges to multilateral agencies
such as the Global Fund. Since most health aid is short-term and
volatile, it threatens the consolidation of long-term interventions;
bilateral efforts, such as the United States Government’s
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), generally
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allocate funds with an important geopolitical motivation [13].
Some multilateral institutions use formal, transparent criteria for
countries’ eligibility to access funding, notably, the Global Fund
has recently reformed its country eligibility criteria as well as the
prioritization of funding partly due to demand surpassing available
funding, and in response to criticism by donors to better align
grant allocations with country program need and budget gaps
[14].
Another way to increase sustainability would be to set and agree
norms for domestic government HIV contributions to national
HIV responses. In 2012, UNAIDS reported that domestic
contributions had reached US$8.6 billion in 2011, an all-time
high, yet low- and middle-income countries are encouraged to do
more [1]. In 2001 the UNGASS declaration encouraged ‘‘com-
mitments of African Heads of State or Government, at the Abuja
Special Summit in April 2001, particularly their pledge to set a
target of allocating at least 15% of their annual national budgets
for the improvement of the health sector to help address the HIV/
AIDS epidemic’’ [8]. External health aid may, perversely,
incentivize recipient LMIC to reduce domestic contributions,
and instead strategically shift government funding to the non-
health sectors [15,16] – this ‘fungibility’ is at odds with the aid
additionality principle endorsed by the Global Fund and other
major HIV donors. At present, there exist no clear conceptual
guidelines or an appropriate frame of reference defining reason-
able expected domestic contribution (EDC).
We present a new approach to defining countries’ expected
domestic HIV funding contributions, redistributing actual global
domestic HIV funding across low- and middle-income countries
based on national income, current health spending, debt service
and other relevant health economic characteristics. This modified
‘‘peer approach’’ [17] is appealing because it takes into account
criteria and country characteristics that are relevant from a
normative point of view (e.g., fairness), as well as the empirical
reality of actual country epidemiologic and income contexts.
Synthesizing estimates of actual domestic and donor HIV funding,
expected domestic HIV funding and total resource need, we then
assess each country’s HIV funding situation in relation to its
epidemiologic and socio-economic situation, and discuss options
for improving global and national HIV resource allocations.
Methods
Data Sources
Data on gross national income (GNI), income group classifica-
tion as of 2010 [18], national debt service, health expenditures,
and population sizes of 84 low- and middle-income countries were
obtained from the World Bank [19]. Debt service are the
payments on total long-term debt (public and publicly guaranteed
and private nonguaranteed), the use of credit from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and the interest on short-term debt. Long-
term debt service payments are the sum of principal repayments
and interest payments in the year specified. These data are
collected by the World Bank Debtor Reporting System [19].We
used UNAIDS estimates of national HIV incidence, actual
domestic HIV/AIDS funding and external donor HIV/AIDS
funding, for the most recent year available in each country
(2009 or 2010), based on countries’ two-yearly progress reporting
in the context of the United Nations General Assembly Special
Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) [1,2,20–22](Table 1).
We obtained estimated national resource needs for HIV/AIDS
programming from the 2011 UNAIDS Investment Framework
[23] (Table 1). The Investment Framework provides national cost
estimates for a comprehensive package of HIV/AIDS prevention,
care and supportive services for 139 countries; but detailed costing
for ART was included for only 22 high-prevalence countries. To
obtain the full national resource need for the 117 countries without
detailed ART costing, we imputed the missing ART costs by
applying a fixed cost per-patient year of $ 1065 for low-income
countries and $ 1,200 for middle-income countries, based on costs
estimated among the 22 high-prevalence countries, to the national
number of patients on ART in year 2010 of each of the 117
countries [21].
Expected Domestic Contribution
We estimated expected domestic HIV contribution (EDC) per
prevalent HIV case through median regression, using as predictor
variables: GNI per capita, health spending per capita as a
proportion of GNI per capita, and debt service per capita. The
rationale for including these predictor variables, and their
expected effect on domestic HIV funding, was as follows. GNI
represents country income, which is expected to increase the
capacity for domestic HIV funding. Health spending per capita as
a proportion of GNI per capita is a proxy of the size of the health
sector in the national economy, expecting that greater total
spending on health would be associated with a greater capacity for
domestic HIV funding. Debt service per capita represents
countries’ access to credit markets, which may predict greater
capacity to borrow and invest in HIV programming. For debt
service per capita, 10 countries had missing values; these were
imputed as the median value from the remaining 74 countries.
We chose quantile regression at the 50th percentile, or ‘‘median
regression’’ as the preferred statistical model, to minimize the
influence of outliers. Median regression estimated the expected
median HIV domestic contribution per person living with HIV
(PLWH), conditional on the values of all co-variables. This differs
from least-squares regression, which estimates the mean of the
dependent variable, and is thus more sensitive to extreme values
[24]. Regressions were performed in Stata 12.1, using the
command qreg for quantile regression. (Other regression methods
were used in sensitivity analyses).
We compared the resulting expected domestic contribution
against the actual domestic contribution to estimate domestic
contribution deviations as follows:
DCD~ADC{EDC
where DCD is the Domestic HIV Contribution Deviation, ADC is
the Actual HIV Domestic Contribution, and EDC is the Expected
HIV Domestic Contribution. We also estimated a relative measure
of domestic contribution deviations as follows:
DCD percentage~ ADCEDCð Þ=EDC
Classifying Countries by Actual Resources Versus
Resource Needs
Using the expected domestic contribution per PLWH and the
UNAIDS estimates of actual domestic contribution, actual donor
contribution and national resource needs, we calculated each
country’s HIV resource gap, that is, whether the sum of EDC and
donor contribution is greater or smaller than the overall HIV
resource needs of the country:
HIV Programming Expected Contributions
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Resource gap~
national resource needs donor contributionzEDCð Þ
An exception was made for countries where the actual domestic
contribution exceeded the EDC: in those cases, we estimated
resource gap using the actual domestic contribution instead of the
EDC, so that overall national resource gaps reflected the adequacy
of donor support independent of the adequacy of domestic
funding. Based on actual funding, EDC and corresponding
resource gap, we then classified each country in one of the
following four quadrants:
I. Resource gap exists, as resource need exceeds funding
available, even though the actual domestic contribution is above
the EDC.
II. No resource gap, as available domestic plus donor funding
exceeds the country’s resource need, and actual domestic
contributions are above the EDC.
III. No resource gap, as available domestic plus donor funding
exceeds the country’s resource need, but actual domestic
contribution is less than the EDC.
IV. Resource gap exists, as need exceeds funding available, and
the actual domestic contribution is less than the EDC.
Finally, we summed across countries to obtain global resource
needs estimates, actual and expected contributions as well as
resource gaps to examine the aggregate picture.
Results
Actual vs. Expected Domestic Contributions
Expected domestic HIV funding contribution was estimated for
84 countries that had data available for all relevant predictor
variables. The best-fitting median regression model was:
Y~{48:6z0:078  GNIper capita
z207:2  Health expenditure per capita=GNI per capitað Þ
z215:8 Debt service per capita
where Y is the domestic funding contribution for HIV/AIDS per
person living with HIV, GNI is Gross National Income per capita.
This model explained 35% of variation (R2 = 0.354) in actual
domestic contributions across countries.
Figure 1 shows the deviations in domestic HIV contributions,
defined as actual minus expected domestic contributions for 2009.
Actual domestic contribution exceeded EDC in 43 countries (blue
bars); but it was below EDC in 41 countries (orange bars). The
largest shortages of ADC relative to EDC were estimated for
Gabon ($499 shortage per PLWH), Malaysia ($355), Dominican
Republic ($287), Ukraine ($272) and Angola ($261). On the other
extreme, the highest excess domestic contributions relative to EDC
were found for Romania ($3,830 per PLWH), Mongolia ($2,188),
Argentina ($1,525), Costa Rica ($1,286), and Chile ($1,065). In
general, the magnitude of both shortages and excesses in actual
domestic contribution relative to EDC increased with countries
income level, as expected, since both actual ADC and EDC per
PLWH increase with income level.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding relative deviations in
domestic HIV contributions. For example, Bulgaria (101%) is
contributing domestically about double its EDC. The highest
positive deviations were estimated for Benin (549%), Burkina Faso
(288%), Madagascar (2876%), Mongolia (1739%), Nicaragua
(695%), and Romania (325%) with large relative positive
deviations. On the other hand, Malawi (288%), Ghana
(270%), Nigeria (286%), India (289%) and Vietnam (290%)
had large relative negative deviations.
Domestic and Donor Contributions Relative to Resource
Needs
Figure 3 shows the countries’ classification according to actual
domestic and donor funding relative to resource need. Relative to
resource need (of an overall median of $570 per PLWH), 51
countries have a gap in HIV funding, of a median $314 for 27
countries in Quadrant I, and $173 for 24 countries in Quadrant
IV (Table 1). In contrast, 33 other countries have an ‘excess’ of
HIV funding, of a median $164 in Quadrant II and $221 in
Quadrant III. Across all 84 countries, the median funding gap is
$45 per PLWH.
Countries falling in Quadrant I include Romania, Argentina,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Benin and Burkina Faso. Quadrant I
includes comparatively more middle-income countries with
relatively low HIV prevalence (median GNI per capita of $1870,
adult HIV prevalence of 0.26%) and high resource need of
$1173 per PLWH. Despite domestic funding above the expected,
total funding available in these countries falls short of the need.
These countries and their donors should examine efficiency of
spending in view of the high resource need per PLWH, and donors
may consider increasing funding mobilization as actual domestic
contribution already exceeds EDC.
Countries in Quadrant II, which have sufficient (or more than
sufficient) funding from both domestic and donor sources, include
Mongolia, Nicaragua, Botswana, Cambodia and Chile. Quadrant
II also covers low-HIV-prevalence countries (median prevalence of
0.40%) that have high domestic HIV funding per PLWH (median
of $541) and also high total health spending per capita ($279).
Total annual HIV funding per prevalent case for Quadrant II is
$752, much higher than the median $368 and $483 in Quadrants
III and IV). Given the more-than-sufficient domestic and donor
contributions, countries in Quadrant II may have reason to
scrutinize their technical efficiency in HIV funding utilization.
Quadrant III covers countries which would have more than
sufficient total funding if their domestic contribution would be as
expected: Dominican Republic, Nigeria, South Africa, Ukraine
and Vietnam. These countries tend to have a high GNI (median of
$3,880) and high HIV prevalence (1.1%) compared to countries in
other quadrants. In addition Quadrant III has the largest
proportion of PEPFAR focus countries (29%: 5 out of 17 countries
including the high-HIV-prevalence Namibia and South Africa),
compared to Quadrants I (7%), II (19%) and IV (4%; Table 1).
Countries in Quadrant IV have insufficient funding from both
domestic sources and donors, and include Kazakhstan, Armenia,
Lebanon, Algeria, Bolivia, Swaziland and Sri Lanka. Overall
health spending per capita (median of $124), HIV spending per
prevalent case ($48) and debt service per capita ($91) are lower
than in countries of other quadrants.
When expressing domestic and total funding gap or excess
relative to national resource needs (Figure 4), five countries in
Quadrant III would have more than double of what they need in
resources if their actual domestic contribution was at least equal to
EDC: Fiji, Belize, Malaysia, South Africa, and Vietnam. For
South Africa (y =2104%), our model predicts a funding excess
even though current domestic funding is less than half of expected
(x =244%). Similarly, for Russia our model suggests that there is
50% more HIV funding than needed (y =250%) though current
domestic HIV funding contribution is only a third of expected
HIV Programming Expected Contributions
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(x =226%). On the other extreme, in Quadrant I, Argentina has
a funding gap of 9% of its needs (y = 9%), even though it is itself
funding 225% of its expected contribution (x = 225%).
Aggregating across the 84 countries, for all PLWH in 2009 total
estimated resource need totaled $10.3 billion, actual domestic
contributions $5.1 billion and actual donor contributions $3.7
billion. If domestic contributions were raised to the expected level
in countries where the actual was below the expected domestic
contribution (Quadrants III and IV), total domestic contributions
would increase to $7.4 billion, turning the funding gap for the 84
countries of $1.5 billion into a surplus of available funding of $0.8
billion.
Sensitivity Analyses
We explored several alternative regression models to estimate
expected domestic contribution, to assess the robustness of results
obtained with the base-case median regression presented above.
Sensitivity results are presented in terms of the number of
countries that switch quadrant, and the number of countries with
quadrant switches across the diagonal (i.e., from Quadrant I to III,
or from II to IV, or vice versa). Diagonal switching is important
because it represents a major change in the potential policy
recommendations. The first sensitivity analysis added a quadratic
term for GNI per capita, since the effect of country income on
capacity for domestic HIV funding may be non-linear. This added
variable was however not statistically significant, and it contributed
very little predictive power to the overall model (R2 = 0.356
instead of the base-case 0.354; Table 2).
Second, we added a dummy variable for country income group,
to account for income-related effects over and above per-capita
GNI (e.g., if income group influences countries’ eligibility or
priority for donor funding or international development assistance
[25]). This model did not qualitatively change the main results (not
shown). Similarly, a robust regression([26], rreg in Stata) including
82 countries (excluding 2 outliers) showed similar results to the
base-case median regression, with coefficients for the four
predictor variables all in the same direction and of similar
magnitude. Finally, a least squares results gave coefficient values of
same direction and magnitude, with an adjusted R2 of 0.46. With
robust regression, a total of 13 countries switched quadrants, but
none switched diagonally. With least squares regression ([26], reg in
Stata), 19 countries switched quadrants but only one switched
diagonally.
Figure 1. Domestic HIV Contribution Deviation: Actual minus expected domestic contributions in 2009 (in US$ per person living
with HIV). Bars to the right (blue in color) represent positive deviation: Actual domestic contribution.EDC. Bars to the left (orange in color) are
negative deviations: Actual domestic contribution,EDC. Deviations for Romania and Mongolia are fall off the positive scale of this graph, but are
included in analyses and Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067565.g001
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A last sensitivity analysis focused on ART-specific resource
need, which comprises about a fifth (22%) of total resource need,
ranging across quadrants from 10% in Quadrant I to 41% in
Quadrant III. Since ART resource need for 117 countries was
imputed from the UNAIDS Investment Framework estimates
from 22 other countries, in this sensitivity analysis, we changed the
imputed ART resource need (for countries without a detailed
costing in the UNAIDS Investment Framework) to be $792 per
person-year (instead of base-case $1,065) for low-income countries,
and $1,454 (instead of base-case $1,200) for middle-income
countries – using median person-year cost estimates from a recent
systematic review [27]. This variation in cost assumptions changed
quadrant classification for 5 countries : Burundi (IV R III),
Central African Republic (IR II), Guinea Bissau (IVR III), Mali
(I R II), and Panama (II R I).
In summary, the sensitivity analyses suggest that the country
quadrant categorizations seem to be robust against alternative
specifications of expected domestic contributions, and the critical
assumptions regarding imputed values.
Discussion
We present a simple model situating countries in terms of
resource need relative to actual current domestic and donor
funding for HIV programming. Our analysis identified some
remarkable imbalances among low- and middle-income countries,
with the large variation among countries in domestic and donor
funding for HIV not always explained by differences in need. The
imbalances may relate to the current debate in the development
field featuring two broad camps. One advocating for more foreign
aid [28], and the other proposing that countries should ‘‘pull
themselves up by their bootstraps’’ [29]. There is also a perception
that there are ‘‘basket cases’’ and ‘‘donor darlings’’, meaning that
some countries have more difficulty in making progress because of
a complex relation of historical, political and economic charac-
teristics, while others are more effective in transforming foreign aid
into tangible (even if slow) progress and thus are the preferred
recipients for donors [30].
Several countries with domestic contributions above the
expected are from Latin America (five out of 27 in Quadrant I,
and eight out of 16 in Quadrant II) including Ecuador, Mexico,
Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Guatemala. High spending on
antiretroviral treatment (ART) per person in these countries may
reflect higher costs per PLWH than other regions [27,31,32]. The
higher costs may reflect higher salaries, or higher prevailing prices
of antiretroviral drugs due to difficulty or unwillingness to
negotiate with large pharmaceutical companies [33,34]. As
illustrated in the sensitivity analysis, the results seem to be robust
in regard to the base-case national resource need estimates, which
imputed missing ART costs as a fixed $1,200 per patient-year of
treatment, based on the average resource need estimates.
Quadrant I also has more countries from Europe and Central
Asia (eight out of 27 countries in Quadrant I) such as Belarus,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, possibly for the
same reason.
Figure 2. Relative Domestic HIV Contribution Deviation: (Actual – EDC)/EDC. The figure presents the relative deviation from the expected
domestic contribution (EDC). Bars to the right (blue in color) are positive deviations while bars to the left (orange in color) are negative deviations.
The values for Mongolia (1739%), Nicaragua (695%), and Madagascar (2876%) fall off the scale, but are included in the analyses and Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067565.g002
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Quadrant III is made up of countries with higher HIV
prevalence, higher GNI per capita, higher debt service, higher
expected domestic contribution, and the highest proportion of
PEPFAR focus countries, despite a low total HIV resource need
per PLWH. This quadrant is of particular interest because it begs
the question: Do these countries make a relatively low domestic
contribution as a (perverse) reaction to more than sufficient donor
funding? [16,35]. Indeed, Quadrant III covers many (five out of 17
countries in Quadrant III) of the focus countries of the largest
global bilateral donor, PEPFAR, which had until 2009 focused its
support in 15 high-HIV countries. Of 11 PEPFAR focus countries
included in this analysis, available funding exceeded resource need
in eight (Quadrants II and III). In contrast, disbursements from the
Global Fund, the largest international HIV donor, appear to be
more need-based, with average HIV disbursements per PLWH
lower for Quadrant III than the other three quadrants.
This situation analysis is relevant to eligibility and counterpart
financing criteria used by international donors such as the Global
Fund. From 2012 onwards, the Global Fund requires all supported
countries to make a minimum domestic government co-funding
contribution to the disease program relative to the Global Fund’s
budget for the disease program, of a proportion increasing with
country income (5% for low-income countries; 35% for lower-
middle-income countries, and 65% for upper-middle-income
countries). From the vision that supported programs should strive
to become self-sustaining over time, the proportion of domestic
contributions is required to increase over the years of each grant.
In addition, the Global Fund’s 2011 policy stipulates that in any
year, at least 55% of funding approved for grant renewals across
the portfolio should be for low-income countries, whereas upper-
middle income countries that are part of the G-20 and have less
than an extreme disease burden are no longer eligible for grant
renewals. Future further refinements of the Global Fund’s
eligibility and counterpart financing policy might build on our
presented model, which considers HIV disease burden and
country income level as continuous rather than step-wise
(categorical) determinants of expected domestic contributions,
and in addition accounts for national health expenditures and
debt, as determinant variables [14,36]. Our model resembles the
counterpart financing policy of the Global Alliance for Vaccina-
tion and Immunization (GAVI) that helps poor countries
introduce and scale-up child immunization programs. Since
Figure 3. National HIV control resource availability and gaps, and the balance between domestic and donor funding contributions,
in 2009. The x-axis is the national domestic contribution per person living with HIV (PLWH) in US$ minus the expected domestic contribution (EDC)
per PLWH in US$; the y-axis is the HIV/AIDS resource gap: resource need minus international donor funding and minus actual domestic contribution,
each per PLWH in US$. The color of the circle refers to region: red for Africa, purple for East Asia/Pacific, gray for South Asia, green for Middle East,
yellow for Europe and Central Asia, and light blue for the Americas. Outliers not shown on graph (but included in analyses and Table 1) are: in
Quadrant I (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Egypt, El Salvador, Paraguay, Philippines, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Romania, Uzbekistan); Quadrant II
(Botswana, Costa Rica, Chile, Nicaragua, Mongolia); Quadrant III (Fiji, Gabon, Malaysia); and Quadrant IV (Algeria, Armenia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067565.g003
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2011, GAVI considers national income level and fiscal space to
determine domestic co-financing, and the desired path to self-
sufficiency [37]. Expanding fiscal space refers to opportunities for
broadening the tax base, improving tax administration, obtaining
grants for health programming, reprioritizing expenditures,
improving efficiency, and temporarily borrowing. The WHO
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health suggested that low-
income countries could raise general tax revenues for health in the
order of 2% of GDP [38]. The private sector may be another
partner to more fully engage particularly in high-HIV, upper-
middle-income countries, and in countries with large, multina-
tional enterprises such as South Africa, Namibia and Botswana
[39].
Globally if 41 countries with domestic contributions below the
expected increased their domestic contributions to the expected
level (Quadrants III and IV), the funding situation for the 84
countries analyzed would change from a $1.5 billion shortage into
a $0.8 billion surplus of available funding. Further, if donors re-
allocated aid (according to need to eliminate the funding gap, or
proportionally across gap countries) from countries with ‘excess’
total funding to countries with a gap persisting after the expected
domestic contribution, there will be fewer countries with a funding
gap, among the 51 countries (Quadrants I and IV) that we
estimated to have a funding gap even with domestic contributions
equaling or above the expected domestic contribution.
Total amounts of domestic and donor funding, and the equity of
donor allocations across countries are just the basic components
determining the allocation efficiency. A next step would be to
analyze countries’ allocations within national HIV/AIDS budgets,
such as how much is spent on prevention and how much on
treatment. UNAIDS has previously highlighted that countries with
a concentrated epidemic, such as in Latin America and South-East
Asia, should allocate a larger share of HIV funding to prevention,
in particular for most-at-risk-populations [40,41].
Limitations
Limitations of the analysis relate in the first place to data
availability and quality. Data are weak and of varying quality
especially for actual national HIV funding; for example, domestic
expenditures may often miss expenditures covered under general
health services (such as for health workers in generalized, non-HIV
specialized clinics, who deliver decentralized ART and pre-ART
care). Also, governments may not precisely know program outlays
and corresponding funding from all donors. Notably bilateral
Figure 4. Relative Domestic Contribution Deviation and Funding Gap. The x-axis presents the domestic contribution deviation in relative
terms, as percentage of the expected domestic contribution (EDC); while the y-axis shows the relative resource gap as a percentage of resource need.
The following outliers fall off the scale: Benin (549%, 13%), Fiji (211%, 2220%), Guatemala (74%, 2130%), Madagascar (2876%, 44%), Mongolia
(1739%, 2314%), Nicaragua (695%, 269%) and Romania (325%, 14%). All countries are included in the analyses and in Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067565.g004
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donors that channel funds directly to implementing agencies
rather than through any government agency, such as PEPFAR,
are not completely reported in countries’ expenditure reporting to
UNGASS. New standards are needed for reporting of global
health financial data of improving quality, transparency, and
completeness [15]. As a result, our analysis excluded 55 low- and
middle-income countries included in the UNAIDS’ Investment
Framework. Among those excluded were four PEPFAR focus
countries (Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti and Zimbabwe), and three
additional countries with a generalized HIV epidemic (Djibouti,
Lesotho and Tanzania). All the 55 excluded countries, together,
accounted for 11% of PLWH globally in 2009, and for $2.3 billion
HIV resource need, or 18% of the HIV resource need in 2009 for
all low- and middle-income countries included in the UNAIDS
Investment Framework, not analyzed here [23]. Of the top-20
countries with highest HIV prevalence in 2009, four (Guyana,
Lesotho, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) were excluded from our
analysis due to missing data. Similarly, of the top-20 countries with
the highest number of PLWH, three (Ethiopia, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe) were excluded due to missing data.
Second, national resource need estimates were partially based
on extrapolations from globally averaged per-patient ART costs,
rather than from country-specific information. Our source, the
UNAIDS 2011 Investment Framework, was in the first place
meant as a global assessment, that may not precisely take into
account all relevant local factors such as sizes of most-at-risk
populations, regional cost variations associated with transport and
health and social system infrastructures. However, a sensitivity
analysis showed that quadrant classification was robust against
varying ART cost assumptions within a range of independent
estimates.
The data limitations may explain why, apart from the larger
proportion of PEPFAR support in Quadrant III countries, and the
clustering of Latin America and Eastern Europe/Central Asian
countries in Quadrant I, other variables failed to predict countries’
quadrant classification, with inter-quartile ranges overlapping
among the quadrants for most variables.
Third, we estimated the expected domestic contribution by a
hypothetical re-distribution among countries of actually available
domestic funding. This approach does not address the question of
whether domestic funding may be systematically too low (or too
high) across countries worldwide. This modified ‘peer approach’
takes the global status quo as given, comparing countries to their
peers while adjusting for relevant health financing predictor
variables. Also, EDC represents a mix of two normative variables –
GDP per capita and Health expenditure per capita – and the more
descriptive variable Debt service per capita – which was positively
associated with actual domestic HIV funding, but cannot
necessarily be taken as a normative justification for requiring
higher EDC. Although the proposed method helps to describe
patterns of foreign aid and international development assistance, it
does not directly explain individual country results, notably why
certain countries have actual domestic contributions above what is
expected (Quadrants I and II). Further analysis is required to
understand resource allocation at country level. Above-expected
contributions may result from pronounced and successful HIV/
AIDS advocacy, and/or from unique ‘matching funds’ provided
by international donors such as the Global Fund, who require
their funding to be additional instead of replacing domestic
contributions, possibly causing a relative over-prioritization of
HIV/AIDS compared to other health and development needs
including health systems strengthening [42,43]. It will useful to
analyze in more detail how vertical programming may be both a
cause and a consequence of current global funding patterns.
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The regression estimating expected domestic contributions
identified two outliers with extremely high actual domestic
spending compared to the expected domestic spending per
PLWH: Mongolia and Romania. In Romania, this was due to
high actual domestic spending in 2009 (and 2008), on the HIV
response overall and on ART– provided for free in the public
sector – in particular. The high program cost per PLWH was also
evident from high 2010 and 2011 ART budgets reported in
Romania’s UNGASS report 2012 [44]. Romania’s high domestic
expenditure on ART may (in part) be explained by inefficient
(centralized) ARV procurement [44]. In Mongolia, high spending
per PLWH related firstly to a low number of PLWH. Mongolia’s
estimated incidence of new HIV infections is high compared to
prevalent HIV infections, which justifies a relatively high spending
on prevention activities. Mongolia’s UNGASS 2012 report shows
that prevention was almost 50% of expenditure while treatment
was about 10% [45]. Because we chose median regression as the
model to estimate expected domestic contributions, these outliers
did however not inappropriately influence estimated EDC for the
remaining countries.
Conclusions
This study proposes a general framework to identify resource
allocation imbalances between national domestic and donor
contributions, and between domestic plus donor contributions
and national resource needs. The resulting country classification
points to which countries may deserve more or less domestic and
donor allocations, based on best data available, but along with a
strong plea to improve these data and the methods to estimate
national resource needs and gaps. The marked imbalances among
countries in actual and expected domestic and total funding
relative to need suggest considerable opportunities for improved
efficiency within countries and globally. Recipient and donor
countries need find creative ways to improve how they transform
scarce inputs into more and better-quality health outcomes. The
imbalances also reflect the larger challenge in donor health
funding, which is often determined by political considerations and
the feasibility of exercising funds, rather than solely by real country
need. The algorithm proposed, we believe, is an example of how it
may be possible to identify specific disparities in both domestic and
international HIV/AIDS funding, with a view towards making
this funding more rational and efficient so as to maximize the
impact of HIV prevention and treatment programming.
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